simplistic two-level constitutional system in which certain powers are allocated to the European level and many powers, including implementation and enforcement remain on the Member States levels. 4 The chapter ends by indicating some of the central themes for further research to ensure limiting the dangers of a highly integrated legal system with shared powers on all levels.
A Enforcement of EU/EC Acts by Member States
Generally, in the absence of a delegation of enforcement powers to EU institutions or bodies through EU/EC law, Member States are in charge of enforcement. 5 Equally, in the absence of harmonisation through European law, Member States are obliged to apply their substantive and procedural provisions to ensure enforcement.
Thereby they apply their law within the framework of the general principles of EU/EC law, most importantly the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.
Member States use their administrative and where necessary criminal law system for the enforcement of EU/EC obligations. Since such enforcement activity is Member State action within the sphere of European Union law, Member States are obliged to follow the general principles of law, and acting within the fundamental rights protected by European law.
The legal framework for such enforcement activity by Member States arises essentially from Article 10 EC, Member States are obliged to provide for effective and dissuasive sanctions for violation of Community law obligations. 6 In the leading case Greek Maize the ECJ held that Member States must 'ensure in particular that infringements of Community law are penalized under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive .
Moreover, the national authorities must proceed, with respect to infringements of Community law, with the same diligence as that which they bring to bear in implementing corresponding national laws. ' 7 Next to this principle of equivalence, Member States are also bound by the principle of effectiveness obliging them to provide for procedures which make effective enforcement neither 'virtually impossible' nor 'excessively difficult.' 8 As Jans, de Lange, Prechal and Widdershoven correctly observe, 'where there is a conflict in between the requirements of effectiveness and the requirement of equivalence, the former takes precedence. Consequently Member States cannot claim in their defence against a complaint that Community law has not been effectively 4 To the contrary, Member States' authorities are instead involved in creating EU legislation and implementing acts and the EU is involved in administration and enforcement of jointly created law alongside the Member States authorities. See the contributions in Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Alexander Türk EU Administrative Governance Elgar Publishing (Cheltenham 2006) . 5 Thereby the approach to the distribution of responsibilities to enforcement follows that of general EU administrative law. 6 Case 14/83 Von Colsen and Kamann [1984] ECR I-1891, para 28. enforced, that similar national rules are not effectively either.' 9 Effectiveness requires that Member States may not subject the enforcement of Community law to conditions which 'render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law' even if the same treatment is extended to similar claims arising from an infringement of national law. 10 Further, the Member State provisions have to provide a 'real deterrent effect' against violation of Community law provisions. 11
These obligations exist also when Member States opt for non-enforcement. The Court of Justice held that the 'apprehension of internal difficulties cannot justify a failure by a Member State to apply Community law correctly.' 12 Instead, 'it is for the Member State concerned, unless it can show that action on its part would have consequences for public order with which it could not cope by using the means at its disposal, to adopt all appropriate measures to guarantee the full scope and effect of Community law (…).' 13 Such enforcement action however needs to take place within the framework of Fundamental Rights protected under Community law.
The ECJ requires enforcement action to be proportionate in view of fundamental rights such as human dignity, 14 the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly (also guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR), 15 the protection of the home and other premises (also guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR), 16 non-retroactivity of criminal sanctions (also guaranteed by Article 7 of the ECHR), 17 as well as rights protected under the principle of good administration (also referred to as the right to good administration under Article 41 of the European
Charter of Fundamental Rights). 18
In the framework of applying their procedural and substantive law for the enforcement of EU/EC measures Member States are obliged to also apply their sanctions regimes. This encompasses both the administrative as well as the criminal sanctions. The Member States' sanctions regimes are influenced by European law not only through general principles of law but increasingly from highly detailed Community regulations and directives harmonising both substantive and procedural law of the Member States. Harmonisation of substantive criteria includes provisions on the sanctions applicable for enforcement of EU/EC law. Procedural harmonisation orders integration of sanctions regimes and the investigations of infringements leading to the application of sanctions within the European administrative networks. Member States thereby increasingly encounter a (2007) 51 final, will have to be reviewed. This proposal provided for sentencing ranging from € 300 000 to € 1 500 000 in precisely described circumstances as well as a maximum imprisonment from one to ten years for certain offences conducted with negligence or intent. It also provides that these sanctions can be accompanied by further sanctions such as disqualification from authorisations and the obligation to reinstate the environment.
infringement. 36 The amount of areas which are also being covered by criminal law harmonization is rapidly increasing. Also in the area of the enforcement of intellectual property rights, such propositions for legislation have been made which provides for the exact frameworks of custodial sentences for natural persons and fines and confiscation of good for natural and legal persons. Additionally, it provides for sanctions such as inter alia the destruction of goods, closure of establishments, bans on commercial activity, placing under judicial supervision of enterprises and judicial winding-up of companies. 37 This directive also contains the proposal to regulate certain circumstances for the initiation of criminal proceedings. 38
B Enforcement by EU/EC Institutions and Bodies
Enforcement powers are in some policy areas also delegated to be undertaken by the EU/EC institutions and In that regard, the right to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings is of particular importance inasmuch as it is intended to permit the Commission to obtain evidence of infringements of the competition rules in the places in which such evidence is normally to be found, that is to say, on the business premises of undertakings. That right of access would serve no useful purpose if the Commission' s officials could do no more than ask for documents or files which they could identify precisely in advance . On the contrary, such a right implies the power to search for various items of information which are not already known or fully identified. Without such a power, it would be impossible for the Commission to obtain the information necessary to carry out the investigation if the undertakings concerned refused to cooperate or adopted an obstructive attitude. However, the exercise of the wide powers of investigation conferred on the Commission is subject to conditions serving to ensure respect for the rights of undertakings. In that regard, the Commission' s obligation to specify the subject-matter and purpose of the investigation is a fundamental place only with cooperation by the Member States' authorities unless Community legislation explicitly contains provisions to the contrary. These forms of cooperation between the Commission and the national authorities and courts, who in many cases are necessary to obtain the permission to search private premises, require also a minimum level of review of Commission activity by the national courts in order to assert for example, whether the Commission's request is in compliance with the privacy protection afforded under Article 8 ECHR or the parallel national constitutional law. 43 The approach established in the framework of competition law enforcement in Hoechst have become the norm for legislative acts providing for direct Community institutions' and bodies' enforcement powers. Investigations conducted for example by OLAF (the European anti fraud office) may conduct 'on-the-spot checks and investigations' on the territory of the Member States. 44 If the Member State concerned so wishes, 'the on-thespot checks and inspections may be carried out jointly by the Commission and the Member State's competent authorities.' 45 Further, 'subject to the Community law applicable, they shall be required to comply with the rules of procedure laid down by the law of the Member States concerned.' 46
C Enforcement Networks

In almost all policy areas, cooperation between Member States and European institutions and bodies is a procedural requirement also for enforcement. Enforcement of EU/EC institutions' and bodies' measures by
Member States is undertaken within the administrative networks. Cooperation takes place horizontally between Member States, in the vertical dimension between Member States and European institutions and bodies as well as requirement not merely in order to show that the investigation to be carried out on the premises of the undertakings concerned is justified but also to enable those undertakings to assess the scope of their duty to cooperate while at the same time safeguarding the rights of the defence. 4. Where investigations are carried out with the cooperation of the undertakings concerned by virtue of an obligation arising under a decision ordering an investigation, the Commission' s officials have, inter alia, the power to have shown to them the documents they request, to enter such premises as they choose, and to have shown to them the contents of any piece of furniture which they indicate . On the other hand, they may not obtain access to premises or furniture by force or oblige the staff of the undertaking to give them such access, or carry out searches without the permission of the management of the undertaking. On the other hand, if the undertakings concerned oppose the Commission' s investigation, its officials may, on the basis of Article 14(6 ) of Regulation No 17 and without the cooperation of the undertakings, search for any information necessary for the investigation with the assistance of the national authorities, which are required to afford them the assistance necessary for the performance of their duties . Although such assistance is required only if the undertaking expresses its opposition, it may also be requested as a precautionary measure, in order to overcome any opposition on the part of the undertaking. 5. It follows from Article 14(6 ) of Regulation No 17 that it is for each Member State to determine the conditions under which the national authorities will afford assistance to the Commission' s officials. In that regard, the Member States are required to ensure that the Commission' s action is effective, while respecting the general principles of Community law. Within those limits, the appropriate procedural rules designed to ensure respect for undertakings' rights are those laid down by national law.' 43 Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, para 81: 'It follows that, in order for the competent national court to be able to carry out the review of proportionality which it is required to undertake, the Commission must in principle inform that court of the essential features of the suspected infringement, so as to enable it to assess their seriousness, by indicating the market thought to be affected, the nature of the suspected restrictions of competition and the supposed degree of involvement of the undertaking concerned.' 44 OLAF may also conduct inspections and enforce the inspection rights vis-à-vis EU/EC institutions and bodies. In those cases, no cooperation by Member States' authorities is required. (ECN) to exchange information and request each others' services in gathering such information which is necessary to be 'used in evidence to impose sanctions on natural persons.' In the preamble to this regulation the approach is explained as follows: 'Notwithstanding any national provision to the contrary, the exchange of information and the use of such information in evidence should be allowed between the members of the network even where the information is confidential. This information may be used for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty as well as for the parallel application of national competition law, provided that the latter application relates to the same case and does not lead to a different outcome. When the information exchanged is used by the receiving authority to impose sanctions on undertakings, there should be no other limit to the use of the information than the obligation to use it for the purpose for which it was collected given the fact that the sanctions imposed on undertakings are of the same type in all systems. The rights of defence enjoyed by undertakings in the various systems can be considered as sufficiently equivalent. However, as regards natural persons, they may be subject to substantially different types of sanctions across the various systems. Where that is the case, it is necessary to ensure that information can only be used if it has been collected in a way which respects the same level of protection of the rights of defence of natural persons as provided for under the national rules of the receiving authority.' 50 E.g. on the territory of which the border guards are deployed. But the members of the teams remain subject to the disciplinary rules of their home Member State. 59 Therefore, the applicable law for enforcement measures including the use of force with weapons is a mix of Community law (for the coordination officer), law of the host Member State and law of the home Member States of the border guards in the rapid border intervention teams. 60 Legal Certainty as to responsibility and systems of accountability, legal protection and the judicial review have become an extremely difficult in these network structures. The example of the rapid border intervention teams in the context of FRONTEX shows the extent to which network structures can be developed and how they touch issues as important for enforcement as the use of fire-arms against people. It points to the need for accountability and review procedures which are capable of matching the complexity of the underlying legal constructions. In the long term, a transfer of the system towards a common European border control seems inevitable to avoid the problems of the network administration. The background to the problem is often that not all acts of EU institutions of Member States' institutions implementing EU law, are 'intended to produce legal effects.' 62 Often, acts are aimed at achieving a factual as opposed to a legal consequence. This is especially the case in enforcement networks. Different legal systems have created different expressions for these types of act. 63 For lack of established terminology, I refer to these acts aimed at achieving factual consequences here with the term 'factual acts.' Criteria for legality are the same as for all acts of EU institutions. The institution needs to be competent to act within this policy area in this form and the general legal principles for the legality of Community acts apply such as the principle of proportionality and the protection of fundamental rights and others discussed below in the chapter on general principles of law. If
Member State institutions act in the sphere of EU law, they are bound by respecting these rights under EU law. 64 Administrative action through factual acts is frequent and has in reality become increasingly important. Factual acts are often linked to processing and computing data in administrative networks. 65 The distribution of data is generally an act which can have far reaching and serious impact on the rights of individuals. 66 These may become problematic primarily in the framework of information networks in Europe's integrated administration. Once a piece of information is circling in the network, a private party can only affect the correction of that informationbe if factually correct or not -unless a special legal provision allows for its review. Generally however, there is no remedy against use and computation of information once entered into administrative networks, as long as this information does not lead to a final decision either on the European or the Member State level. Given the expanding use of information networks in European administrative law, this appears to be a dangerous development for legal protection of citizens in EU law, especially in view of the inclusion of sensitive matters for fundamental rights such as criminal investigations and police-cooperation.
A good example for this latter situation comes from the Tillack case. 67 Hans-Martin Tillack a journalist accused by OLAF of having paid a Commission official for internal Commission documents, attempted to bar the Commission and OLAF from 'obtaining, inspecting, examining or hearing the contents of any documents and information' which had been seized at his premises. 68 It appears from the case that the seized information could be obtained by OLAF prior to a final review of the legality of the seizure under national law. The only potential remedy which could stop the use of such information obtained by the agency would be to bring a claim for interim measures under Article 243 EC. Such however will only be granted if prima facie the application in the main procedure would be well founded. Due to a lack of formal decision, the main procedure -a case under
The question thus arises how to avoid a legal situation in which EC institutions can factually breach the rights of individuals without the possibility of effective judicial review. 70 One approach to this type of factual acts -the feeding of information into an information network -could be to allow for the review of the factual correctness of the information in the discretionary review of a final decision. However, the very fact of uncontrolled data streams containing wrong and potentially damaging information, can in itself contain a violation of the fundamental rights of the person to whom such data refers. Given the lack of direct judicial remedy against a factual act within the current system of legal remedies on the European level, this might easily amount to violations of the principles of effective legal protection -i.e. the existence of rights which are not legally enforceable. There are basically three ways out of this dilemma of the potential breach of the principle of effective judicial review. 71 One would be to follow an approach used in French jurisprudence, and consider that a refusal to remedy a violation of an individual's right by a factual act, to be regarded as a decision and thus be viewed as an act which could be annulled as result of an annulment procedure under Article 230 EC or the equivalent in a national jurisdiction. This approach has been tentatively adopted in a first case before the CFI accepting that a certain type of 'physical act, necessarily entails a tacit decision'. 72 The solution goes in the direction to widen the notion of a decision by allowing for implicit decisions in cases where acts may damage the rights of parties. Tendencies to such jurisprudence also exist in the area of the implicit effects of a decision of the Commission to award a contract to one party and thereby not awarding the contract to another. 73 Additional damages suffered due to the violation of the rights of an individual would then be remedied under Article 288 EC. The most far reaching solution, finally, would be to adapt the approach to judicial protection to the realities of integrated administration and the growing role of information networks therein. This would imply the ECJ's jurisprudence to redefine the meaning of the legal effect of a decision and take rights-based approach. If there is right which is violated by a factual act or a decision, there needs to be a judicial remedy available to protect the right. This would imply a turn towards a more 'subjective right' based approach by the ECJ and by national legal systems.
Next to questions of access to judicial review, there are as this contribution has briefly highlighted with certain examples, further procedural rights which need to be protected specially in composite multiple-step procedures These are especially defence rights, rights to fair hearing and effective access to documents in cases of multiplestep decisions. The challenges are therefore to combine the increasingly integrated nature of EU and national law Belgium for violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights on freedom of expression (ECtHR 20477/05 Tillack v Belgique of 27 November 2007). Unfortunately, the case has so far had not effect on the EU institutions who deny any relation to the ECtHR decision, despite the European Ombudsman having submitted a special report to the European Parliament in which he concluded that the suspicion of bribery which OLAF had communicated to the Belgian authorities to incite the search and confiscation of Tillack's documents in order for OLAF to find the source of Tillack's journalistic information had been based on mere rumours. The Ombudsman concluded in his recommendation that OLAF should acknowledge that it had made incorrect statements when requesting the Belgian authorities to act. 
